Abstract. Recently, Harn and Lin (1998) developed a two-phase authenticated key agreement protocol which enables two parties to share multiple secret keys. The rst phase of their protocol is the most important part and can be used to deliver a sequence of temporary random public keys to the other one in an authenticated approach. In this short paper, we demonstrate an improved version of this novel scheme after giving some cryptanalytic details of the original Harn-Lin scheme.
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In 1] Harn and Lin developed a two-phase authenticated key agreement protocol which enables two parties to share multiple secret keys. In the rst phase of their protocol, n temporary random public keys are delivered to the other party in an authenticated approach. A Di e-Hellman 2] like key distribution method is employed in the second phase by the two communication parties to share n 2 ? 1 independent secret keys.
In the following, for the purpose of demonstrating a possible weakness if the system is not carefully designed and showing how to develop possible modi cations, a special example of the protocol will be reviewed. There are two parties A and B involved in the protocol, however only the role played by A will be described, B acting in a similar manner. Party A This work was supported by the National Science Council of the Republic of China under contracts NSC87-2213-E-032-012 and NSC87-2811-E-032-0001. 
party B can be convinced of the authenticity and the integrity of both r A1 and r A2 as announced in 1].
In the second phase of the protocol, a multiple-key distribution/generation process is performed. Suppose that A has already received fr B1 ; r B2 ; s B ; cert(y B )g and has veri ed the authenticity and the integrity of r B1 and r B2 . Party A then derives K 1 = r k A1 B1 mod P, K 2 = r k A2 B1 mod P, K 3 = r k A1 B2 mod P, and K 4 = r k A2 B2 mod P. Only 3 of the 4 keys will be used in order to provide perfect forward secrecy 4] which disables an adversary to deduce all the shared common secret keys between A and B if one of the keys has ever been learned. The topic is important, however it is not the main concern of this paper. The interested readers can refer to the original works in 1, 4].
2 The Cryptanalysis and the Improvement 
The 
over the reals. Therefore, given r A1 and r A2 , let q be a small factor of r A1 , then we take r 0 A1 = r A1 =q and r 0 A2 = r A2 q. Note that r A1 is divisible by a small factor with high probability; moreover r 0 A2 = r A2 q will be smaller than P with some probability. Note also that we can try simultaneously with a small factor of r A2 . This implies that the original Harn-Lin scheme is not secure. The following example clari es the claim. Fortunately, the previous forgery can be prevented by imposing both r A1 and r A2 to be in the range dP=2e; P ? 1]. Since 2 is the smallest possible factor of either r A1 or r A2 , then either 2 r A1 or 2 r A2 will be greater than P. It is therefore impossible for the cheater to nd such r 0 A1 and r 0 A2 under this modi cation.
An Improved Protocol
However, a more simple and e cient alternative can be developed which can also be free from the above demonstrated attack but, of course, both r A1 and r A2 should be in the range dP=2e; P ? 1] . In this improved protocol, party A computes k A = (k A1 + k A2 ) mod (P ? 1) 
Recall that now we force both r A1 and r A2 to be in the range dP=2e; P ?
1]. Therefore, if the cheater tries to corrupt the integrity then he faces the situation of solving the impossible problem in Eq. (4) Finally, note that for party B since the parameter r A is not required, one expensive modular exponentiation computation can also be eliminated as for party A.
